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Abstract
In order to protect themselves against the potential losses in case of a participant’s
default and to contain systemic risk, central counterparties (CCPs) need to maintain
suﬃcient ﬁnancial resources. Typically, these ﬁnancial resources consist of margin
requirements and contributions to a collective default fund. Based on a stylized
model of CCP risk management, this article analyzes the main factors aﬀecting the
trade-oﬀ between margins and default fund. The optimal balance between these two
risk management instruments is found to depend on collateral costs, participants’
default probability, and the extent to which margin requirements are associated with
risk-mitigating incentives. Given the increasing role of CCPs in ﬁnancial markets
in general and for ﬁnancial stability in particular, these considerations are not only
important for CCPs themselves, but also for ﬁnancial regulators.
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1 Introduction
Central counterparties (CCPs) are a critical element of ﬁnancial markets’ post-
trade infrastructure. While originally introduced to absorb the counterparty
risk for exchange-traded derivatives, they are increasingly used in cash markets
and, most recently, for OTC (over-the-counter) derivatives. 1 The spread of
CCPs into new market segments is often welcomed as an important step in
strengthening the resilience of the ﬁnancial system and actively supported by
ﬁnancial regulators (see e.g. Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2008).
A CCP is an entity that interposes itself between trading partners to become
a buyer to every seller and a seller to every buyer, thereby ensuring settlement
even if one of the original trading partners fails to meet its obligations. Al-
though the terms CCP and clearing house are frequently used synonymously,
there is a conceptual distinction (see Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems (CPSS) 2003). While a CCP is narrowly deﬁned as an entity taking
over the counterparty risk in a ﬁnancial transaction, a clearing house is deﬁned
more broadly as a central location or central processing mechanism through
which ﬁnancial institutions agree to exchange payment instructions or other
ﬁnancial obligations. This might include assuming the counterparty risk in a
ﬁnancial transaction, but not necessarily so. Since this article focuses on the
management of counterparty risk, we use the term CCP in the remainder of
this paper, keeping in mind that our ﬁndings are valid also for those clearing
houses which assume the counterparty risk incurred in ﬁnancial transactions.
While simplifying risk management for its participants, CCPs concentrate
counterparty risk in a single entity. To avoid that CCPs themselves fail and
become a source of systemic risk, they need a strong risk management frame-
work. In particular, any CCP’s risk management needs to ensure that the CCP
has at its disposal suﬃcient ﬁnancial resources in order to cover the potential
losses in case of a participant’s default. To achieve this, CCPs may rely on a
variety of risk management instruments. Broadly speaking, these instruments
can be grouped according to two principles: the defaulter-pays principle and
the survivors-pay principle. The defaulter-pays principle is typically imple-
mented by requiring each participant to provide collateral in form of margins
to cover its current risk exposure. In case of a participant’s default, the CCP
then relies on the margins provided by the defaulting party to cover poten-
tial losses. In contrast, the survivors-pay principle is typically implemented
by establishing a pre-funded collective default fund. In case of a participant’s
default, the CCP then relies on the default fund to cover any losses.
Some aspects of the risk management techniques applied by CCPs have been
analyzed in great detail especially in the context of CCPs for exchange-traded
1 For a historical overview of the role of CCPs see for example Kroszner (2000).
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futures. In particular, various studies investigate the optimal size and cal-
culation method for margin requirements, taking into account the potential
exposure over one or more days. These studies typically draw on statistical
models, optimization models, or option pricing models. For example, Kupiec
(1994) and Kupiec and White (1996) evaluate the degree of risk protection
from margin requirements based on diﬀerent calculation methods. Other stud-
ies such as Gemmill (1994), Bates and Craine (1999) and Shanker and Balakr-
ishnan (2005) analyze the combined adequacy of margins and other ﬁnancial
resources available in the case of default. An overview of these and other
studies is provided by Knott and Mills (2002).
CCPs usually apply a combination of the defaulter-pays and the survivors-pay
principles to cover the losses from a participant’s default. A common practice
is to set margin requirements to cover the losses incurred should a participant
default under normal market circumstances, while a default fund would ac-
count for the losses in excess of the margins. As a consequence, the default
fund contributions would typically only be used if a participant defaults in
highly volatile market conditions. While this seems to be common practice
among CCPs, we are not aware of any in-depth analysis on whether such a
combination of risk management instruments is optimal. Indeed, the existing
literature provides only very limited guidance on the optimal balance between
margins and default fund contributions. In this paper, we therefore investi-
gate the factors determining the optimal risk management combination for a
CCP and analyze under what conditions margin contributions, default fund
contributions or a combination of these are advisable.
While additional margins and default fund contributions both increase the
ﬁnancial resources available to a CCP to cover potential losses in case of a
participant’s default, their eﬀectiveness in covering such a loss and their cost
implications for participants diﬀer. On the one hand, establishing a pre-funded
collective default fund minimizes the individual contributions by mutualizing
the loss from a default, similar to a default insurance. On the other hand,
default fund contributions tend to be comparatively more costly than mar-
gins, as there is a positive probability that some fraction of a (non-defaulting)
participant’s default contribution will be retained by the CCP to cover the
losses caused by another participant’s default.
In addition, to the extent that margins and default fund contributions create
diﬀerent incentives for participants, this should be reﬂected in the design of a
CCP’s risk management framework. Two diﬀerent incentive mechanisms might
be distinguished. First, to the extent that participants’ access to collateral is
limited, margin requirements put a cap on trading positions and consequently
on the maximum loss a participant can incur for the CCP (Hartzmark 1986,
Hardouvelis and Kim 1995 and Gibson and Murawski 2008). Second, as in the
case of other insurance mechanisms, a collective default fund might lead to
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moral hazard problems by creating less incentives for a participant to avoid
default, as the cost of the default is partially borne by the other participants
through their default fund contributions (Kahn and Roberds 1998). 2 At the
same time, the need to deposit margins in relation to current risk exposures
is likely to limit a participant’s leverage and risk-taking, thereby lowering its
default probability. Therefore, ceteris paribus, increasing the relative impor-
tance of margin requirements in the CCP’s risk management framework might
decrease both the likelihood of and the size of the potential loss in case of a
participant’s default.
Taking into account the cost of collateral and the diﬀerent incentives created
by margin requirements and default fund contributions, this article analyzes
how these two instruments should be combined in a CCP’s risk management
framework. The results are relevant for CCPs, market participants and regu-
lators. For CCPs, having an adequate balance between margin requirements
and default fund contributions is essential, not only from a risk management
perspective, but also for commercial reasons. Indeed, as competition between
CCPs has become more ﬁerce in recent years, in many market segments trad-
ing parties now have a choice regarding the CCP they want to use for clearing
their trades. For market participants, the quality of the CCP’s risk manage-
ment and its cost implications are critical factors to be taken into account
when deciding whether to make use of CCP services, be that as a direct or
indirect clearing member. Again, careful evaluation of these factors is particu-
larly important if market participants have the choice between several CCPs.
Finally, since CCPs are critical for the stability of the ﬁnancial system as a
whole, ﬁnancial regulators also take a strong interest in CCP risk manage-
ment. Indeed, even though the international standards for central counterpar-
ties published jointly by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
(CPSS) and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO)(CPSS/IOSCO 2004) cover a broad range of
issues, it is clear that regulators’ primary emphasis is on ensuring that CCPs
apply sound risk management practices and that they have suﬃcient ﬁnancial
resources at their disposal. Moreover, the rapid spread of CCPs into new mar-
ket segments and the increasing competition accentuates the importance of
understanding the pros and cons of alternative risk management instruments,
not least to avoid regulatory arbitrage.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy reviews
the role of CCPs and Section 3 discusses the risk management instruments
they typically apply. Section 4 introduces a stylized model that allows to
analyze how margins and default fund contributions should be combined in
2 Although Kahn and Roberds (1998) focus on payment systems with deferred net settlement,
their analysis can also be applied to the context of a CCP. For a description of the defaulter-pays
and survivors-pay principles in the context of deferred net settlement payment systems see Bank
of England (2005).
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the CCP’s risk management framework, taking into account the diﬀerent costs
and incentives these instruments imply. Section 5 concludes and points out
some areas of interest for future research.
2 The Role of Central Counterparties
A CCP interposes itself between the trading parties at the moment or right
after they enter a transaction. The CCP assumes the obligations related to
the transactions and guarantees their fulﬁlment. It thus becomes the buyer to
every seller and the seller to every buyer.
For the trading parties, clearing via a CCP can provide various beneﬁts (see
e.g., Giordano 2002 and Ripatti 2004). First and foremost, the CCP elim-
inates counterparty risk vis-` a-vis other trading parties. When concluding a
transaction, the trading parties incur the risk of the other party defaulting
and not fulﬁlling its obligations. This credit exposure typically exists from the
point in time the transaction is concluded until the settlement of the result-
ing obligation(s). By interposing itself between the trading partners, the CCP
assumes these counterparty risks and guarantees the fulﬁllment of the obliga-
tions, even in the case one of the trading partners defaults. A participant thus
no longer has to worry about the solvency of all its trading partners but can
focus on managing its exposure vis-` a-vis a single counterparty, the CCP. This
is particularly useful if trading takes place via an anonymous trading platform.
Moreover, as CCPs typically enjoy very high credit standings, the involvement
of a CCP may reduce capital charges. Finally, CCPs establish detailed default
procedures, creating transparency and certainty on the process to be followed
should one of the participants default.
Participants of a CCP may also beneﬁt from multilateral netting. Especially if
market participants have to provide each other collateral based on their open
positions, multilateral (instead of bilateral) netting allows to reduce the collat-
eral to be posted. 3 Also, with multilateral netting, the number of obligations
to be settled is signiﬁcantly lower than in the case of bilateral or no netting
at all. Not only allows this to reduce transaction fees and liquidity cost, but
it also minimizes settlement-related principal and liquidity risk.
Finally, provided trading takes place on an electronic exchange or multilateral
trading platform with anonymous trading (pre-trade anonymity), the use of a
CCP allows to maintain anonymity also after a transaction is concluded (post-
3 The beneﬁts of multilateral netting compared to bilateral netting have been investigated in
several studies. Baer, France and Moser (1996) show that the move from bilateral to multilateral
netting is improving social welfare. Jackson and Manning (2007) quantify these beneﬁts using a
simulation approach.
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trade anonymity). Non-disclosure of trades ensures that participants’ trading
strategies remain conﬁdential.
3 Risk Management Instruments
As CCPs concentrate counterparty risks in a single entity, their failure could
have systemic implications and lead to widespread disruptions in ﬁnancial
markets. CCPs are thus critical elements of the ﬁnancial system and it is
important that the risks related to their activities are adequately managed.
In general, the nature of (ﬁnancial) risks that need to be managed depends
on the type of markets or ﬁnancial instruments for which the CCP oﬀers its
clearing services. That is, the risk proﬁle of a CCP clearing cash markets such
as equities or bonds is not the same as the risk proﬁle of a CCP clearing
exchange-traded or OTC derivatives. Of course, these diﬀerences need to be
taken into account in the CCP’s risk management framework. For instance,
if the ﬁnancial instruments to be cleared via the CCP involve the settlement
of mutual obligations (e.g. the delivery of bonds or equities against the pay-
ment of funds), the CCP may face principal risk, which is deﬁned as the risk
that it fulﬁls its contractual obligation while its counterparty fails to fulﬁl
its obligation. To eliminate principal risk, the CCP’s risk management would
thus have to ensure that transactions are settled via a delivery-versus-payment
mechanism.
However, irrespective of the underlying ﬁnancial instrument to be cleared, the
main risk component for a CCP is replacement cost risk, which materializes if
one of the participants defaults on its contractual obligations during the pe-
riod between the time the trade was agreed and the time of ﬁnal settlement. In
that case, in order to be able to live up to its own obligations vis-` a-vis the non-
defaulting participants, the CCP has to enter into a replacement transaction
which may be possible only on less favorable terms. The potential loss to the
CCP (i.e. its risk exposure) is thus a function of (i) the defaulting participant’s
open positions at the time of default and (ii) the (adverse) price movements
that have taken place in the underlying ﬁnancial instruments since the origi-
nal contracts were entered (market risk). With regard to the management of
replacement cost risk, CPSS/IOSCO (2004) suggest that CCPs should hold
suﬃcient ﬁnancial resources to withstand the default of at least their largest
participant (in terms of risk exposure) in extreme but plausible market con-
ditions. From a systemic risk perspective, this is the key requirement for any
CCP.
To comply with this requirement, CCPs ﬁrst need to assess their potential
losses in case of a major participant’s default. Typically, such assessments
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rely on stress-tests, which analyze the impact of a major participant’s de-
fault combined with extreme (unfavorable) movements in market prices. Both
factors—the maximum exposure and the adverse price movements—can be
based on historic observations or on theoretical assumptions. CCPs then need
to ensure that their ﬁnancial resources are suﬃcient to cover the identiﬁed
potential stress losses. To do so, CCPs may rely on various risk management
instruments, which can be broadly grouped according to two principles: the
defaulter-pays principle—where the defaulting participant covers the loss—,
and the survivors-pay principle—where the loss is covered by the remaining
participants. The defaulter-pays principle is typically implemented by requir-
ing participants to post margins in relation to the current risk exposure they
incur for the CCP. That is, an increase in the participant’s open position or
an increase in market volatility (or both) translate instantaneously into higher
margin requirements. In contrast, the survivors-pay principle usually requires
participants to make contributions to a pre-funded collective default fund. In-
dividual default fund contributions are typically based on each participant’s
(average) risk exposure over a longer time period. These contributions are thus
less reactive to temporary shifts in current open positions or changing market
volatility.
4 A Model of CCP Risk Management
In practice, CCPs tend to apply both margin requirements and default fund
contributions, but to varying degrees. This raises the question whether there
is an optimal balance between these risk management instrumtents, and if
yes, by what factors this balance is aﬀected. To answer these questions, this
section introduces a stylized model of CCP risk management.
4.1 Assumptions
The model covers one period, which could be interpreted, for instance, as
one day, one month or one year. The market place for which the CCP oﬀers
its services is covered by i = 1...n homogenous and risk-neutral ﬁnancial
institutions. The CCP is user-owned and user-governed, which ensures that the
CCP’s risk management framework reﬂects the preferences of its participants.
A ﬁnancial institution’s beneﬁt from clearing its transactions via the CCP is
Bi. As discussed in Section 2, this beneﬁt may arise from the reduction of
counterparty risk and simpliﬁed risk management, multilateral netting and
post-trade anonymity. Participants’ cost related to clearing their transactions
via the CCP are threefold:
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(1) Service fees Fi, intended to recover the CCP’s operational cost (including
some return on capital). Fi is assumed to be a ﬁxed cost.
(2) Opportunity costs Ci from posting collateral at the CCP in the form of
margins, a default fund contribution, or both. The marginal opportunity
cost of collateral is α ≥ 0.
(3) In case of another participant’s default, the remaining participants might
lose some or all of their default fund contributions (but none of their
margins). The associated expected cost is denoted Li.
Financial institutions’ expected utility from participating in the CCP thus is
Ui = Bi − Fi − Ci − Li. (1)
Below, we will assume that Bi is suﬃciently large, so that the participation
constraint Ui ≥ 0 is always satisﬁed. Moreover, since Fi is a ﬁxed cost and
does not depend on the CCP’s risk management framework, the analysis will
focus exclusively on the two other cost factors, Ci and Li.
Given participants’ trading strategy (which is not modeled explicitly), any
participant defaults with some positive probability on its obligations vis-` a-vis
the CCP during the period under consideration. In case of a default, the CCP
invokes the close-out netting procedure, which—depending on the defaulting
participant’s positions and movement of market prices—may or may not result
in positive replacement costs and thus a loss to the CCP. For any participant,
the probability of a default which leads to positive replacement costs for the
CCP is φ > 0. Note that we ignore those defaults which do not result in
a loss to the CCP (because the replacement cost is negative). Hence, the
default probability may be larger than φ. For simplicity, it is assumed that
the replacement cost Λ is uniformly distributed over the range [0,Λmax] and
that at most one participant defaults per period.
The regulatory authority requires the CCP to have at its disposal suﬃcient
ﬁnancial resources R to cover its losses in case of default of any of its partic-
ipants in extreme but plausible circumstances. In other words, the regulator
requires that R ≥ Λmax, which ensures that the CCP will always be able to
fulﬁl its obligations vis-` a-vis the non-defaulting participants.
Each participant is obliged to provide ﬁnancial resources (i.e. collateral) to the
CCP in the form of margins (Mi), pre-funded contributions to a default fund
(DFi), or both. Due to homogeneity the total default fund is DF =
￿
i DFi =
n · DFi. In case of participant i’s default, the CCP may have recourse to Mi
and DF in order to cover its losses. The regulatory requirement can thus be
written as
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R = Mi + n · DFi ≥ Λmax. (2)
In case of a default by participant j, the CCP covers the loss Λ in the following
order:
(1) The CCP realizes participant j’s margins Mj.
(2) If Λ > Mj, the CCP realizes also participant j’s default fund contribution
DFj.
(3) Eventually, if Λ > Mj + DFj, the CCP will take recourse to other par-
ticipants’ default fund contributions on a pro rata basis.
In case of participant j’s default, it is thus possible that some fraction of the
(non-defaulting) participant i’s default fund contribution will be used by the
CCP to cover its losses. The (expected) cost for participant i is captured by
the term Li in Equation (1).
As there is no reason for the CCP to hold more ﬁnancial resources than re-
quired, it will be assumed that the regulatory requirement in Equation (2)
holds with equality, in which case each participant’s default fund contribu-
tion can be written as a function of its margins, i.e. DFi =
Λmax−Mi
n . The




Ti(Mi) = Ci(Mi) + Li(Mi), with Mi ∈ [0,Λmax], (3)
and where Ti measures participant i’s total (expected) cost associated with
the CCP’s risk management framework.
In the following, we will analyze how the CCP should set the level of margins
(and hence implicitly also the size of the default fund), taking into account
the trade-oﬀ between collateral costs (Ci) and the expected loss of individual
default fund contributions (Li). From the perspective of a participant, this
trade-oﬀ can be summarized as follows: Low margin requirements (which imply
a high default fund) allow to economize on collateral costs but go along with
higher expected losses in case of another participant’s default; high margin
requirements (which imply a low default fund) cause high collateral costs, but
the expected losses in case of another participant’s default are lower or even
zero.
As outlined in the introduction, one would expect that the optimal balance
between margin requirements and default fund contributions can also depend
1010 11
on the intensity of two incentive mechanisms associated with margin require-
ments. That is, to the extent that higher margins contribute to limiting partic-
ipants’ risk exposures and/or to reducing their default probability, the CCP
should increase its margin requirements (compared to the situation where
these incentives are absent). However, to ease the exposition, subsection 4.2
ﬁrst determines the optimal risk management framework for the case where
incentives are absent (benchmark model). Subsection 4.3 then discusses to
what extent the result is altered if the CCP’s risk management framework
aﬀects the probability of a default with positive replacement cost for the CCP
and/or the maximum loss to the CCP in case of a default (extended model).
4.2 The Benchmark Model
In this section, it is assumed that participants’ trading and risk management
behavior is not aﬀected by the CCP’s risk management framework. Or, to put
it diﬀerently, an individual participant’s probability of a default with positive
replacement cost for the CCP (φ) and the maximum loss to the CCP in case
of default (Λmax) do not depend on the CCP’s risk management framework
(i.e. on the combination of margins and default fund contributions).
In order to determine the optimal balance between margins and default fund
contributions, the terms Ci and Li need to be speciﬁed in more detail. First,
participant i’s opportunity costs of collateral increase linearly with the level
of margins and default fund contributions to be posted at the CCP. In this
respect, it is instructive to look at the implications of two extreme solutions.
On the one hand, if the CCP relies solely on a default fund and thus Mi = 0,
it is apparent from Equation (2) that each participant would have to make
a contribution to the default fund of DFi = Λmax
n and thus Ci = αΛmax
n . On
the other hand, if the CCP’s risk management is based solely on margins
and hence DFi = 0, it follows that each participant would have to provide
margins of size Mi = Λmax and thus Ci = αΛmax. There are of course an
inﬁnite number of intermediate solutions, but in general the opportunity costs
for collateral can be written as
Ci(Mi) = α(Mi + DFi) =
α
n
[Λmax + (n − 1)Mi]. (4)
Turning to the second term Li, note that participant i’s expected loss due to
the default of any of the other n − 1 participants can be written as
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Li = (n − 1)φLGDi, (5)
where φ is the probability of a default resulting in positive replacement cost for
the CCP and LGDi is participant i’s expected loss of its default contribution
given a default by any of the other participants. In order to determine LGDi,
assume that participant j defaults. The expected residual loss to be shared
between the non-defaulting participants—i.e. the expected loss to the CCP
after subtracting the margins and default fund contributions by j—is equal
to E(Λ) − (Mj + DFj). Taking into account that E(Λ) = Λmax
2 , Mj = Mi,
DFj = DFi, and DFi =
Λmax−Mi








n if 0 ≤ Mi < n−2
2(n−1)Λmax
0 if n−2
2(n−1)Λmax ≤ Mi ≤ Λmax.
(6)
In case of another participant’s default, the expected residual loss is thus
decreasing in Mi, reaching zero whenever margins are set suﬃciently high.


























0 if α > φ
n−2
2(n−1)Λmax if α < φ
(8)








n if α > φ
Λmax
2(n−1) if α < φ.
(9)
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The two cases are illustrated in Figure 1. 4 One may observe that irrespective
of the speciﬁc parameter values for α and φ, it is always beneﬁcial to establish
a default fund, whereas the exclusive use of margin requirements is never
optimal. This can be explained by the fact that if margins are set above
a certain level, the risk that default fund contributions are being retained to
cover other participants’ losses becomes very small, which makes the collective
default fund more attractive.
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The relative importance of the optimal default fund in the CCP’s risk manage-
ment framework, in the following measured by the variable df ≡ DF ∗/Λmax ∈
[0,1], depends on the speciﬁc parameter values. If the opportunity cost of
collateral is larger than the default probability (α > φ), then df = 1 and
the CCP should thus not collect any margins at all. In contrast, if α < φ,
then df = n
2(n−1) and the optimal balance between margins and default fund
contributions depends on the number of clearing participants: The more par-
ticipants, the smaller should the relative importance of the default fund be.
As the number of participants increases, the risk of a default increases, even
if the participants’ individual default probabilities remain unchanged. This
increases the expected loss on default fund contributions and makes them
less attractive. However, even with a large number of participants, the size of
the default fund should never fall below 50% of the total required ﬁnancial
resources.
How do these theoretical results relate to existing CCPs’ risk management
arrangements? As noted above, CCPs typically apply a combination of both



















margin requirements and default fund contributions. Assuming that CCPs
have chosen an optimal risk management framework, this would imply that
the opportunity cost of collateral is lower than the perceived probability of
a default with positive replacement cost for the CCP. For instance, assuming
that opportunity cost of collateral is 5 basis points per annum, this would
imply that the perceived default probability of participants over a one year
horizon is larger than .0005.
4.3 The Extended Model
In this subsection, the model is expanded by taking into account that margins—
as opposed to default fund contributions—may aﬀect participants’ behavior
via two diﬀerent incentive mechanisms.
First, margins may limit the maximum loss the CCP needs to cover in case of a
participant’s default. Indeed, higher margins make peak exposures more costly
and, in addition, to the extent that participants face a collateral constraint,
margins impose a cap on participants’ trading activity and hence their risk ex-
posures. These assumptions are supported both theoretically and empirically
by Hartzmark (1986), Hardouvelis and Kim (1995) and Gibson and Murawski
(2007). One might argue that higher default fund contributions also increase
the cost of trading and therefore reduce trading activity, but these contribu-
tions are typically tied to average risk exposures over a past period. They thus
have only a limited bearing on peak trading activity and risk exposures.
In our model, the impact of higher margins on the maximum risk exposure is
captured as follows:







Λmax thus now deﬁnes an upper limit for the loss (namely if Mi = 0), and the
parameter δ can be interpreted as measuring the intensity of this incentive
mechanism: The larger δ, the stronger is the dampening eﬀect of margins on
participants’ risk exposure and on the maximum loss in case of a default. One
may also note that it can never be optimal to collect margins higher than
Λmax
1+δ , as this amount would always be suﬃcient to cover the maximum loss.
The second incentive mechanism takes into account that higher margins are
likely to increase participants’ incentives to avoid default, thereby reducing
default probability. Indeed, to the extent that the risk of default is an endoge-
nous variable as argued by Kahn and Roberds (1998), too strong reliance on
the collective default fund in the CCP’s risk management framework can raise
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moral hazard issues and lead to higher default rates than is socially optimal.
By internalizing the cost of default, higher margins reduce the incentives to
free-ride on resources provided by other participants and may limit risk tak-
ing. Hence, increasing the relative importance of margins in the CCP’s risk
management framework is expected to reduce participants’ default probabil-
ity. 5
This incentive mechanism is captured by assuming that the probability of a
default (with positive replacement cost for the CCP) ˜ φ depends on the level
of margins as follows:





, with φ ≥ φmin > 0,Mi ∈ [0, ˜ Λmax]
The parameter φ now deﬁnes an upper limit to the probability of a default
resulting in positive replacement cost. A gradual increase in Mi reduces the
endogenous default probability ˜ φ, which reaches the lower limit of φmin when
margins are raised to Mi = ˜ Λmax. The spread between φ and φmin captures
the intensity of this incentive mechanism. The larger the spread, the stronger
the impact of margins on participants’ default probability.
To what extent do the two incentive mechanisms aﬀect the optimal CCP risk
management framework? First, note that the regulatory requirement now is
R = Mi + nDFi ≥ ˜ Λmax = Λmax − δMi. (10)
Maintaining the assumption that the regulatory requirement holds with equal-
ity, it follows that DFi =
Λmax−(1+δ)Mi
n and hence
˜ Ci(Mi) = α(Mi + DFi) =
α
n
[Λmax + (n − δ − 1)Mi]. (11)
Moreover, the expected loss due to the default of any other participant now is
˜ Li = (n − 1) ˜ φ ￿ LGDi, (12)
where
5 Gibson and Murawski (2007) point out that margin requirements may negatively aﬀect partic-
ipants’ wealth and welfare and hence, under speciﬁc circumstances, may increase a participant’s
default probability. In our model, this eﬀect is not taken into account.
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￿ LGDi(Mi) = 1















The cost minimization problem can thus be written as
minMi ˜ Ti(Mi) = ˜ Ci(Mi) + (n − 1)˜ φ ￿ LGDi
=
α
n[Λmax + (n − δ − 1)Mi]
+ (n − 1)
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As it is not possible to derive closed-form solutions for M∗
i or DF ∗
i from
the ﬁrst-order condition, we evaluate the results numerically. To facilitate the
discussion and to compare the results with the benchmark model, it is again
useful to look at the relative importance of the default fund in the CCP’s risk
management framework, which now is ˜ df ≡ DF ∗/˜ Λmax ∈ [0,1]. Depending
on the values of the parameters α and φ, the following four cases can be
distinguished:
Case 1: α is signiﬁcantly larger than φ. Recall that in the benchmark
model, for α > φ, it would be optimal to rely solely on a collective default fund.
Now, allowing for incentive eﬀects, the maximum loss and the probability of
default need to be highly sensitive to margin requirements in order to make
margins attractive, i.e., δ would need to be high and φmin signiﬁcantly lower
than φ. For realistic values of δ and φmin, however, the CCP should again rely
exclusively on default fund contributions, i.e. ˜ df = 1.
Case 2: α is slightly larger than φ. The sensitivity of the maximum loss
(described by δ) and the default probability (described by φ−φmin) to an in-
crease in margins can now compensate for the slightly higher cost of collateral
relative to the default probability and make margin contributions in combina-
tion with a default fund worthwhile for the CCP’s risk management. As can
be seen in the left panel of Figure 2, which shows ˜ df for various parameter
combinations of δ and φmin, ˜ df drops quickly as δ increases, while the eﬀect is
less pronounced for a reduction in φmin. This can be explained by the oppos-
ing eﬀects a reduction in φmin has on the optimal margin requirement. On the
one hand, margin contributions reduce the total cost of risk management by
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reducing the default probability and therefore margin contributions become
more attractive. On the other hand, however, the lower default probability
makes default fund contributions comparatively less costly, as the risk that
some or all of the contributions are retained to cover losses from a partici-
pant’s default is also reduced. Overall, a reduction in φmin still increases the
optimal amount of margins, but to a lesser (and declining) degree compared
to an increase in δ.
Case 3: α is slightly smaller than φ. As the sensitivity of the maximum
loss to margins increases (i.e., an increase in δ), the optimal absolute level of
margins decreases, as the maximum loss is reduced. However, the optimal bal-
ance between margins and default fund contributions (and therefore also ˜ df)
remains unchanged. An increase in the sensitivity of the default probability to
margins (i.e. a decrease in φmin) leads to a higher ˜ df. While this might seem
counter-intuitive at ﬁrst sight, it is again explained by the opposing eﬀects a
reduction in φmin has on the optimal margin requirement. On the one hand,
margins reduce the total cost of risk management by reducing the default
probability, which makes margins more attractive. On the other hand, how-
ever, the reduced default probability makes default fund contributions again
less costly, as the risk that some or all of the contributions are retained to cover
losses from a default is reduced. Overall, and as illustrated in the right panel
in Figure 2, a reduction in φmin decreases the optimal amount of margins and
increases ˜ df. This is exactly the opposite result as in case 2, where a reduc-
tion in φmin was found to increase the optimal amount of margins. While this
might seem counter-intuitive, it is explained by the fact that only by requiring
margins the CCP can proﬁt from a reduction in the default probability, which
then again makes default fund contributions more attractive. Therefore, the
negative eﬀect of margin requirements on the default probability makes a bal-
anced combination of margins and default fund contributions preferable for
the CCP.
Case 4: α is signiﬁcantly smaller than φ. An increase in the sensitiv-
ity of the maximum loss to margins (i.e. an increase in δ) reduces the opti-
mal absolute level of margins, but leaves the optimal combination of margin
requirements and default fund contributions unchanged. An increase in the
sensitivity of the default probability to margins (i.e. a decrease in φmin) has
no eﬀect on the optimal balance nor the absolute level of margins and default
fund contributions.
These results thus demonstrate that by taking into account incentive eﬀects
margins become more attractive in some—but not all—cases. In particular,
it is again never found to be optimal for the CCP to rely solely on margin
requirements. That is, even if the alleged incentive eﬀects of margin require-
ments are important, it is always beneﬁcial to establish some sort of collective
default fund.
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Fig. 2. Optimal Default Fund Contribution Share – Extended Model
If the cost of collateral is signiﬁcantly smaller or higher than the probability of
a participant default (with a positive replacement cost for the CCP), incentives
typically have no eﬀect on the optimal combination of the risk management
instruments. However, if cost of collateral and the probability of a partici-
pant default are fairly similar, incentives can determine the optimal balance
between margins and the default fund. If the maximum loss decreases with
an increase in margin requirements, the latter can become preferable even if
the opportunity cost of collateral is equal or slightly higher than the proba-
bility of a participant default. If we take into account that margins reduce the
probability of a participant default, a balanced combination of default fund
contributions and margins becomes preferable. If the opportunity cost of col-
lateral is smaller than the default probability, there is the counter-intuitive
eﬀect that an increase in the sensitivity of the default probability to margin
requirements can actually reduce the optimal share of margins relative to the
default fund. Indeed, in that case, even a small increase in margin require-
ments implies a signiﬁcant reduction of the default probability, which in turn
makes the default fund contributions comparatively cheaper.
In any case, provided that one or both of the alleged incentive mechanisms
exist, the optimal balance between default fund contributions and margin re-
quirements is similar to or lies in between the two corner solutions established
for the benchmark model in Section 4.2. Moreover, it should also be noted that
the total cost of collateral associated with the CCP’s optimal risk management
framework is lower than in the benchmark model.
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5 Conclusions and Further Considerations
In this paper, we have analyzed the optimal combination of margin require-
ments and a collective default fund in a stylized CCP model. The model takes
into account the total cost of collateral, participants’ default probability and
the potential risk-mitigating incentives associated with margins.
We ﬁnd that establishing a default fund is always optimal, and in some
cases a suﬃciently large default fund is even all it takes. The use of margin
requirements—and hence a somewhat smaller default fund—is recommended
if the opportunity cost of collateral is lower than the probability of a partic-
ipant’s default (resulting in a positive replacement cost for the CCP). More-
over, the imposition of margin requirements becomes more attractive if they
are associated with risk-mitigating incentives, e.g. if higher margins reduce
participants’ default probability or if they put a cap on the maximum loss in
case of a participant’s default.
In practice, CCPs typically combine margin requirements with a default fund.
Against the background of our theoretical results, this could be attributed to
two potential causes: It could mean that the opportunity cost of collateral
is low compared to the perceived probability of a participant’s default; or it
could imply that margins have (or are said to have) signiﬁcant incentive eﬀects
which are taken into account in the CCP’s risk management framework. The
two explanations are not mutually exclusive.
Our work has implications for CCPs as well as regulatory authorities. In par-
ticular, it suggests that the design of CCPs’ risk management frameworks
should carefully weight the cost and beneﬁts (including incentives eﬀects) of
diﬀerent risk management instruments. Indeed, by striking the optimal bal-
ance between margin requirements and default fund contributions, CCPs can
either enhance their resilience to ﬁnancial shocks without imposing additional
cost on their participants, or they can achieve a certain level of resilience at
lower cost. At the same time, our results suggest that regulatory authorities
should not only focus on the total level of ﬁnancial resources available to a
CCP, but also take into account how the various risk management instruments
are combined and what kind of incentives they create.
There are a number of extensions to our stylized model which warrant further
investigation. First, it would be interesting to allow for multiple defaults. Sec-
ond, one might relax the risk-neutrality assumption by modeling risk-averse
participants. In that case, we would expect the optimal balance between risk
management instruments to shift towards higher margin requirements. Third,
the assumption that the losses to the CCP in case of a participant’s default are
uniformly distributed could be relaxed, for example by analyzing losses which
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are positively skewed. Fourth, one might study how heterogeneity among par-
ticipants (e.g. in terms of diﬀerent trading volumes and hence risk exposures
or in terms of diﬀerent default probabilities) would aﬀect optimal CCP risk
management.
Finally, it should be stressed that while the model captures two particular
incentive eﬀects associated with margin contributions, it leaves aside other
potential incentives. In particular, Knott and Mills (2002) argue that the mu-
tualization of risk creates stronger incentives for clearing members to take an
active interest in the CCP’s risk management, which could have beneﬁcial
eﬀects on the CCP risk management standards and the quality of its par-
ticipants. Contrary to our model, this would reduce the default probability
when the share of default fund contributions in the CCP’s risk management
increases. From a broader ﬁnancial stability perspective, one might also men-
tion that margins can have pro-cyclical eﬀects. Indeed, as margins tend to in-
crease in times of higher market volatility, they potentially add further stress
to participants’ liquidity needs (Borio, Furﬁne and Lowe 2001). As default
fund contributions are typically less pro-cyclical, taking into account this ef-
fect might also shift the optimal balance between the two risk management
instruments in favor of a higher default fund.
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